

at the SAR Cost Summary of December 1982, that seems to be exactly what has happened.

I return now to the Air Force's "A³" report. It states in part: "The principal problem is program instability which in turn is caused by funding instability, requirements instability, and technical problems, and all three are interdependent. Very seldom do you have one without the others. The impact has been less equipment bought than could have been with the same amount of money, and the prospect is that the problem will get worse if we continue to do business as we do now."

The report later states by implication what it means by 'business as usual.' "We are trying to do too much with our current budget and as a result we are not doing many things well. We need to maintain the current plan for stable and efficient programs and stabilize the budget, schedule, and technical baseline of high priority programs. What this means is, limit new starts and cancel inefficient/low utility programs to stabilize what we have in the FY85 POM. The key to the entire process however is to budget to most likely costs. Unless we face reality at the beginning of a program, we will stay in our present mode of responding to the 'squeaky wheel.'"

I hope you will forgive me, Mr. Chairman, this long trek through what may appear to be subjects outside the immediate interests of this Committee. I believe, however, that these are matters of the highest importance to the national defense, and that this Committee can contribute directly to significant improvements with regard to them.

Two areas of improvement suggest themselves: estimating costs at