

### 5. Extreme Complexities

- a. Pursue complicated ICBM basing modes that create extravagant costs in return for questionable capabilities.
- b. Pursue technological innovations that users operate and maintain with difficulty.

### 6. Budgetary Imbalances

- a. Provide defense resources that rarely are well matched with U.S. commitments and postulated threats.
- b. Divide the defense budget in ways that inhibit force modernization, readiness, or both, requiring costly "catch-up" efforts to reduce resultant risks.

Many U.S. plans consequently are unsuitable, infeasible, unacceptable, and/or inflexible in various combinations. Acceptability in terms of cost has been most common, indicating that U.S. resource allocators, rather than strategic planners, frequently have the final say.

### COMPOSITE IMPLICATIONS

Defense planning standards outlined below afford a useful yardstick for measuring U.S. performance over a period now approaching four decades (1946-1983).

-- Competent Planners. Neither selection nor retention policies consistently people the system with top officials or staff assistants who are prepared by education and experience to perform effectively.

-- Team Play. Divided loyalties and jurisdictional disputes pull the system apart at every level, often causing cross-purpose planners to put a greater premium on intra-system competition than partnerships.

-- Goal-Oriented Guidance. Disagreement on fundamental goals, which often are poorly identified (even undefined), makes it difficult or impossible for U.S. defense decisionmakers to advise the President adequately or give subordinate planners proper guidance.

-- Spectrum of Plans. The absence of basic research, ponderous procedures, and prejudiced opinions, reduce opportunities for (sometimes prevent) alternative plans that attack problems from several perspectives, using assorted assumptions and scenarios.