

**JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) began a basic review of their apparatus and procedures about mid-1982. I understand that they personally conducted all deliberations, because they believe that effective reform is a matter of immense importance and high priority. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps "theologians," who might complicate issues instead of clarifying them, were deliberately bypassed. Not even Vice Chiefs of the four U.S. Military Services received invitations to assist investigations.

Primary emphasis was on self-help, but the intent also was to recommend solutions for consideration by the President, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and/or Congress concerning problems beyond JCS control.

General John W. Vessey, Jr., present JCS Chairman, explained the process and its consequences in detail during a lengthy session with me on March 10, 1983. Subsections which follow summarize his salient points.

**Phase I: Reconfirm JCS Functions**

The Joint Chiefs returned to "Square One," so they could assess JCS statutory duties delineated in Section 141, title 10, United States Code. They found that those functions are sound. Faults, in their opinion, lie mainly with performance.

**Phase II: Focus on Demands**

Two fundamental demands then came into focus:

-- The need for better advice on strategic plans, provided to the President, National Security Council (NSC), and SECDEF in more timely fashion (which means before they ask for it, as defined by General Vessey).