means to offset Soviet quantitative superiority. That, in turn, presents a particular challenge to the DoD manager. While he is developing a weapon to defend against a Soviet capability, the Soviets are seeking a means of neutralizing the new weapon -- heavier armor on the front of a tank to counter a new anti-tank weapon or electronic countermeasures to jam the radar in our high performance fighters. So if we are to have weapons that are not obsolete before they are put in the hands of our troops, we must be willing to take some technical risks and accept a certain amount of concurrency. Even though we have more failures in the development program we will end up paying less because we reach operational capability in a shorter time. Of course this assumes that we commit the time and money it takes to do well the task of production planning and support.

In response to the third topic you asked me to discuss -- Negotiating Better Acquisitions -- I will review some of the measures currently being taken to control those costs. But first I will address your initial topic.

Selecting Weapon Systems

Requirements for new systems may arise in any one of three ways: (1) intelligence identifies a threat for which we have no appropriate defense; (2) our military forces identify an operational deficiency; (3) new objectives or changes to our strategy require new hardware. Based on those requirements and an analysis of technological opportunities, the Services then develop mission need statements and performance requirements. While the procedures and documents for defining requirements differ from Service to