

have the charge of being just an emissary from the Army. I did it with self-interest in mind, because I felt that an Army officer doing well up there was going to affect the decision that someday could affect the Army and the other services. It was always made by good men, and the Army is prepared to live with those decisions.

As you say, it depends on the service and the individual and the Chairman—not the Chairman, but the Chief of Staff of the service.

I would say the Chairman should have the authority to fire anybody without cause, and I would say if he is not compatible to his environment, if he is not doing a good job, send him back. That has never been done with that informal procedure. If you fired Smith because Smith just might be a round peg in a square hole, he might still have a very fine career.

I never thought to give the Chairman the right to select—in other words, to ask the services to send a list of the people they proposed to assign by their record. It is all right to do that, but he doesn't know these men outside of his own service. He can't judge the importance of the serious task they left, and it is just unfair to the services and to the Chairman to give them responsibility for which he does not have the background. I wouldn't want it as Chairman. I want it understood by my service Chiefs of Staff that they would be responsible for the quality of their own people and be able to look the Chairman and the Secretary in the eye, and say, "I can vouch for these men."

Mr. NICHOLS. I appreciate your testimony very much, because the thrust of what you have told us this morning is you think we ought to strengthen the Chairman of Joint Chiefs, give him a little more background, and give him a little more authority to run the show up there.

Yet, you seem to have some hesitation in giving him veto power necessarily on who is coming to his Staff. The point is well made that he may never come in contact with Commander Smith or Colonel Jones, and he wouldn't know these people. But you have testified that after they get on board, after they have served some months, and if their services are not such as he thinks he should have, then he ought to have authority to dismiss them.

General TAYLOR. Right.

Mr. NICHOLS. The reason I ask the question is that there are some officers who feel like an assignment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is sort of the end of the line, that this precludes any further promotions they might have.

There are others who feel like it is a ticket that needs to be punched, in the vernacular of the military, if they are going on up the line.

Are there any other questions from members?

General TAYLOR. May I?

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, sir.

General TAYLOR. One device turned out to be very good. It was President Eisenhower's. He was very much impressed after World War II with the need for giving promising officers Joint Staff experience. Joint didn't mean just the Joint Staff, but a Joint Staff like the one in CINCPAC or in Europe, NATO, something of that sort. To this end he required that for every nominee for a general office-