

ability, and then apply his efforts elsewhere, especially when you have a domineering Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as I had at that time. I could take my job away from him.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much, General. We appreciate your being with us today.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have just one question for General Taylor.

General, last year, so many of our witnesses stated that in their view the weakness with the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not in the organization itself but in the personalities that composed the organization.

Now, you probably had more opportunity to work with the organization and to view it over the years.

What is your view on that point—that it is a personality rather than an organizational problem?

General TAYLOR. Well, I have argued for years for the need for organizational change, but I hope I have always made clear that good organization and mediocre people will get no place. Good organization should be designed to make it easier for good men to do their tasks, but in no way could it really replace the quality of the individual.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you.

General Taylor, in the last part of your statement, you were talking about what position the Secretary of Defense should have in the chain of command, and you give three alternatives.

Conceivably, he could be the principal assistant of the Commander in Chief in all matters relating to the chain of command, or he might be a deputy to the Commander in Chief with such duties as the latter might assign.

A third possibility is for him to be an independent command authority in the chain, just below the President, responsible to him for the combatant commands in all that they do.

Could you give us your thoughts on which of those three alternatives that you lay out would be the preferable alternative?

General TAYLOR. I really—I take it the negative—which is the worst one? No. 3. It would probably be unconstitutional. It has been suggested that something of that sort will take place.

I would think that—it depends, of course, on what the President expects from his Secretary and his Chairman, and until we know that and get it into the law we can't be sure how that relationship should then be related to the Joint Chiefs.

The President may want the Secretary of Defense at his elbow, an able civilian with broad experience in the military field, to help him as an adviser. He should also want a military man to give him military advice at the same time. But this civilian could well be a deputy commander in chief doing those things that the President gives to him. I raise this point because I would hate to see the law so precise that the President must assign certain things to the Secretary, if he is going to be an assistant or a deputy.