

These studies seem to come up with the same suggestions or recommendations that go something like this.

First, we should have an organization that will give a unified view to the National Command Authorities; namely, the President and the Secretary of Defense. Well, in the first place, I would point out that on the Joint Chiefs of Staff you have represented some 180 years of military service, which was performed during several wars and in environments which were somewhat different in terms of whether you are in the air or on the sea or on the land.

And, consequently, it is important, in my view, that the President of the United States receive not just a single recommendation but rather options as to what would be the best course of action from which we would choose.

Next, it has always been felt by many that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be separated from the services, on the grounds that they do not have enough time to perform both assignments.

My position is that if you do not, cannot find enough time to perform your duties as chief of a service and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you are not qualified for the job, because I think it is mandatory that those who plan an operation or plan strategy are burdened with the responsibility of executing it. And if you separate these two groups of officers, very shortly the members—those that are chiefs of services—will be the ones that have all the information as to the state of readiness, the state of logistics and the capabilities of the units at the moment.

And particularly in a crisis, where we are called on by the Chief Executive to deploy forces overseas, it is certainly necessary to understand the state of readiness of these forces. I do not believe, that a separation of these assignments will provide such a connection.

Now, it has been said by General Jones, I believe and others, that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not have enough authority. In my opinion, and based on my experience—which I will say was unique because I served at a time when this country was in a state of near anarchy. We had people pouring blood on the Pentagon steps, lying down in front of automobiles on Constitution Avenue, throwing rocks through the FBI Building and Southeast Washington was plundered and ablaze. And the public was very disenchanted with the Vietnam War and consequently there were many political turmoils that were created as a result of these extreme difficulties.

Consequently, I would say, though, that never did I find that I did not have enough authority. Not once did I ever give an order to people in uniform or did I carry out instructions of the Secretary of Defense and the President without getting the very fullest cooperation of everyone in uniform, including not only the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but the unified commanders and those all down the line.

So I contend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with respect to those in uniform, has all the authority he is willing to take.

Now, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is faced with two kinds of problems. One is a problem which, of course, is not time limited in the sense that you are working up a strategic plan or