

he is chairman of the council, then he attends the National Security Council meetings. And that will mean that you won't have a single man in uniform present at the National Security Council meeting.

So I think that this whole concept of having a kind of a super-council with, as I said before, a Wizard of Oz sitting over directing strategy and advising the President—as General Vessey pointed out so clearly in his statement, it is not reorganization that you must deal with so much as it is relationships between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the members and between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President. And I must emphasize, Mr. Chairman, the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Now, I had the misfortune to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a time when the President and the Secretary of Defense did not see eye to eye on many matters. Consequently, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I was frequently caught in the middle. The Constitution says that the President is the Commander in Chief. And Presidents, using that part of the Constitution, frequently like to deal directly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On occasion, they would do that, at least Mr. Nixon would do that, and Mr. Laird would not be aware of it. And then I was faced with the problem of telling Mr. Laird what Mr. Nixon told me he wanted Mr. Laird to do.

So I come back to the point, and I close with this, by saying that the problem certainly is not in the organization of the military structure. I think that there are many improvements that should be made and can be made. I think that they are within the prerogatives of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other than those recommendations or proposals contained in the bill, H.R. 3145.

But I don't think that the Congress can pass a law or establish an organization that accommodates every personality, both political and military, that winds up assigned in these positions. And in the final analysis, I would say with some pride that I think under the circumstances the military people have done quite well.

I would hope that we would never get into a military confrontation that was fought the way Vietnam was, because here was a conflict wherein the personnel were never really sure of what the national objectives were. On top of that, we had the greatest detail of instructions passed down by those who actually knew nothing about the problem.

I am a great believer in civilian control. And I think that that is the way the Constitution reads and those in uniform are strict constitutionalists. However, I think that the military should be told what to do, but not how to do it. In the Vietnam war we used to be told how many bombs to put on each wing of the airplanes and what kind of bombs to use by people who had never seen a bomb.

But I don't know how you are going to solve that in a democracy if you have an administration that is manned by people, such as Secretary McNamara and his staff, who was supported by the President.