

**Admiral MOORER.** Yes, sir, there are definitely problems. But if you go back to our basic concept of government, we have checks and balances. And I would be very alarmed if a service chief, for instance, did not support his programs. That is what his duties are. And the young officers, for instance, would immediately have a collapse of morale if they thought that the Chief of the Navy, for instance, wasn't going to support a shipbuilding program, or something like that.

I just think in our system it is a matter of maintaining balance, based on intelligence. And I do think that there has been very significant progress made in the concept and participation in joint operations, wherein all three services work together. That has progressively improved since the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created.

I don't think that the Congress can devise legislation that would prevent an officer from supporting his particular environment in which he has served for 35, 40 years. And I think it would be very undesirable if such a thing happened.

So you start out to put together a force which has the capability of meeting several threats. In other words, we cannot in my opinion devise our military forces around a single strategy and a single weapons system, because if you do, the enemy becomes aware of that and immediately will attack you in another area where you have more or less pushed aside.

This is the way the old general staff idea comes across, and people always cite how successful the Germans have been using the general staff. But I point out to you that the Germans also lost two wars.

If we had a system of government where the Joint Chiefs of Staff would say on May 5 next year we want you to invade Russia or something of that kind, you would approach this whole acquisition of weapons and everything entirely differently. But we sit back. We are not going to attack anyone unless we get attacked first. So you have to be able to respond.

And that I think is the key point about why our system appears to so many people to be developed on the basis of bickering and arguments over roles and missions.

**Mr. BRITT.** What I am hearing is at the interservice level it works well; it works all right given the fact that we are entirely defensive and not having any offense.

At the service level, do you feel the process as it unfolds in planning, trying to meet the threat, planning weapons systems, research and development, and the end product that we wind up with, given our system of government, pretty well does that? Does it work well? Do we wind up with a proper response to the threat in your estimation?

**Admiral MOORER.** Well, you are always going to have—the answer to your question is “Yes.” But naturally you are going to have these “60 Minutes” programs and so on. You take something like the Mark 48 torpedo. I was involved in the initiation of that development in 1952. And about 10 years later we had a “60 Minutes” program saying how terrible it was and how much had been wasted. Today it is the best torpedo in the world.

What I am saying is that for some reason the media in particular seem to—when you are testing a new system, they expect it to