

work the first shot. And if it doesn't work, they come out with horror stories about it. The point is, if you knew it was going to work the first shot, you would not fire it in the first place. You have to make the tests to get the bugs out of the thing. And yet you get a tremendous media coverage of a failure of a test effort.

So I would point out again, I repeat, we are dealing with the very frontier technology. Naturally the things a lot of times are not going to work.

Mr. BRITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Admiral, in your testimony last year I believe you stated that reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be a very decisive issue. Would you explain what you meant by that?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I think, again going back to the fact that we have devised our entire government, beginning with the executive, legislative and judicial branches, on the basis of coequality and balance of power, so to speak, that if you put one individual in charge of the whole—in other words, go to in essence a single service, if not in terms of the same uniform, in terms of total and central control, I think that it would certainly destroy the relationships that General Vessey is talking about in his statement.

So you have got to have this close cooperation and understanding and mutual assistance if you are going to get the best out of the people as well as the best out of the equipment, itself. To me—I said that because I thought the reorganization that was being discussed would not lead to further cooperation and coordination, but would divide.

Mr. NICHOLS. You have brought back a lot of memories to some of us on this subcommittee this morning in your reference to the Vietnam era, at which time you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Chief of Naval Operations. That poses a question with me.

You were also dissatisfied with the way the war was being conducted. But you were a military man, and you followed orders. Did you at any time during those years in which you were somewhat unhappy in the way the war was being conducted from upstairs, did you express your concern to the Congress on the conduct of the war?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, I did, sir, on occasion. As a matter of fact, I got, you know, involved in this a couple of times and was told I was expected to support the administration.

Well, I discussed this with Mr. Stratton before. Congress also asks: "Do you support such and such an action?" Well, of course, you have two alternatives in an executive pyramid. It is the same way—I am on the board of directors of Texaco. It is the same way. If one of the vice presidents cannot support the chairman of the board, he has two options. He can support or he can work for Mobile or somebody else.

And so unfortunately there is not another military organization for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to work for. But anyway, yes, I did. But I think the Congress never did question the details of how this war was really being managed.

I know Mr. Stennis, who was chairman of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, held a big, extensive hearing on this. I know that Admiral Sharp came to Washington. He was the Commander in Chief Pacific at the time. He very clearly told the Preparedness