

Subcommittee the target selection was improperly handled, and so on. After that, President Johnson never called him by name, he just called him "that man." "That man is back in town."

So I think that the Congress should ask questions along these lines, "If you were doing it, would you do it this way?" That type of thing, rather than say do you support—that is almost a stock question—do you support such and such?

But the Vietnam war was so bad in terms of how the Office of the Secretary of Defense interfered with the tactics in terms of, you know, telling how many aircraft to launch and how far they were to go, up to 20 degrees. Then if Le Duc Tho didn't get the word, they let you go up to 21 degrees, and if he softened up a little bit, we would back off to 19 degrees latitude.

That was all nonsense. No military person in his right mind would have operated the Vietnam war that way. It was a ridiculous situation when you look back on it, Mr. Chairman, to think that a country with fewer people than we have in two counties in the State of California, Los Angeles and Orange Counties, did what they did to the United States. It was ridiculous. We could have cleaned that thing out.

For instance, I will tell you an example. The first thing we did, we spotted the construction of an SA-2 missile site. So I asked permission to attack it. I was told that this is a deterrent, they are not going to shoot at you with that missile, but if they do, we will let you attack it. By the time we finally got authority to attack the missile sites, they had built 8 of 16 of them, and it got to be an entirely different problem.

We could have prevented the construction of those things in the first place by never letting them get the first shovel in the ground. But we were not allowed to do that. I can cite you many other examples.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Ray, further questions?

Mr. RAY. Admiral, we have had a number of rather distinguished witnesses before the subcommittee. Some have indicated the Secretaries of Defense in past years have come to rely upon civilians for military advice because of the inability of the Joint Chiefs to agree on a central military problem.

Admiral MOORER. I think the statement they rely on civilian advice isn't quite true. I don't agree with it, because I could cite, as I did in my statement last year, that the advice that we gave the Secretary of Defense and the President was never followed.

I was Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. I flew back to Washington with a request to mine Haiphong Harbor. That was in 1965. And this was not approved. And it was not until 1972 that I was called in to Mr. Nixon's office, and he said, "How long will it take you to make a plan to mine Haiphong Harbor?" I said 3 seconds. We mined Haiphong Harbor with exactly the plan that I had written back in 1965.

And here we were flying a thousand sorties a day, and we took just 26 airplanes, only 25 out of 1,000, and they were gone about 2 hours, and they dropped those mines, and not one ship entered or left that harbor from then on until we, ourselves, went and took the mines out.