

But nevertheless, they would have a couple no one would accept, and then the other one would be the one that they were supporting themselves, so obviously he would check it. Unfortunately, the correct way to do it was the fourth option, which wasn't on the paper.

So I think that if the Chief of the Service has a Vice Chief, he sets a policy, and he shouldn't get involved in day-to-day details.

Mr. SKELTON. So the Vice Chief runs the show.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, he runs, you might say, the operation. You have to remember that the Chief of Naval Operations, that is a misnomer. There was a day when he was in fact the Chief of Naval Operations. But he no longer is. He is the Chief of Staff just like you have in the Army and the Air Force.

But I think that one of the biggest mistakes a senior person can make, be he chairman of the board of a corporation or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or even Secretary of Defense, or what have you, is to get totally immersed in detail.

Mr. McNamara, for instance, would sometimes get a scale model of a carrier deck and a scale model of airplanes and see whether we were telling the truth about how many you could put on a deck. So I think that the senior man should delegate authority. I do not agree that the man dealing in strategy and so on wouldn't have time to guide his service.

As a matter of fact, that is the whole point. He goes down and participates—he finds out what the next move is going to be, where the problem has been worked out with our allies, then it is his responsibility to go back and make certain his particular service is properly trained and equipped to carry out its assignments in this strategy or extended strategy or new plan.

If you have some person completely separated, you get back to what I said at the outset, that those who make the plans have got to be responsible for the execution in my opinion.

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral, during the time you were the Chief of Naval Operations, and then later the Chairman, was there ever a year when the defense expenditure went down or stayed the same, to your recollection?

Admiral MOORER. Well, my biggest difficulty during that period had to do with the appropriation for shipbuilding. Mr. McNamara put out a policy statement that said we will buy for attrition and not for modernization. And this meant since we didn't have any ships sunk, we were not—we were not buying any ships. The Congress would probably be startled—in my last year as CNO, the shipbuilding budget was \$800 million. But the budget, of course, dealt with taking care of attrition, procurement to replace attrition.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. McDonald.

Mr. McDONALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your letting me sit in. I was over at Military Construction Subcommittee hearings testifying. I was very pleased to hear that Admiral Moorer would be testifying before your subcommittee. I was anxious to hear his testimony on this whole matter. I found it very helpful.

Admiral, you brought up a number of points that I found fascinating. I agree with Congressman Stratton regarding the fact that