

tary Brown, cited the inability of the Joint Chiefs to provide crisp advice in a timely fashion.

Would you have any suggestions or proposals as to how those deficiencies or problems could be overcome within the current organization, to provide more timely and crisp advice, which Secretary Brown said he was not getting from the organization?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I don't know that Secretary Brown would ever get it. But I think, as I said before, you have got two kinds of advice: advice that is time sensitive, that has to be given instantly on the telephone, which normally comes direct from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—it should; and advice as to long-range advice on strategy and so on.

And I think that again I come back to what General Vessey said in his statement—it is a matter of relationships. For instance, every President functions differently, and so does every chairman of the board of a corporation.

Mr. Johnson, for instance, didn't really use the National Security Council in the stated purpose in the law. He had what was called the Tuesday lunch. If you wanted to get an answer to a certain problem, what we were going to do, you had to attend the Tuesday lunch rather than the National Security Council meeting following it, after essentially the decision was made.

So unless the military people are given an explicit statement as to what the national objective is, and know where we are headed, they are never going to get any crisp advice. How can you advise when you don't know what you are trying to do? You can make recommendations, which we did over and over again, about actions such as mining Haiphong Harbor.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were very, very firm on their statement that the Bay of Pigs operation would not succeed unless the Cuban Air Force was knocked out. The decision was made to not knock it out because it was based on a civilian field, and you might kill some civilians. So the first thing they did was fly out and sink the ammunition ship. And the people that went ashore against the Cubans only had the ammunition they had in their pockets.

I don't think the Joint Chiefs of Staff can in any way prevent things like that from happening if the political masters want to change the rules at the last minute. But I guess Secretary Brown was talking about the Iran rescue effort. But, there again, in that particular case they kept insisting this is not a military operation, it is a rescue operation. So that put a different light on it.

The next thing they did was to set these milestones saying if you don't have a certain set of conditions at this point, you turn around and come home. But if you go, you go here. But then if you don't have a preset set of conditions, you turn around and come home.

In the old days, you heard the expression, "burning your bridges behind you." In the old days, the kings used to make the generals burn their bridges behind them so they could not run back. But here instead of burning the bridges, they built a bridge every time they reached a new stage in the operation.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. One more question.