

that several times. I will give you an example. I was very much in favor at that time, and this was before the so-called Yom Kippur War, of establishing a joint task force in the Asian Sea. Well, I could not sell that to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But anyway, I sent in my own recommendation. That is when—back before the 1973 war.

Mr. BARRETT. You know, Admiral, the law doesn't even say the Chairman is the JCS spokesman, although that word is normally used to describe the Chairman. It merely says he informs the Secretary and the President when the Joint Chiefs of Staff have disagreed. But what you are saying is that he is really responsible for being an adviser in his own right, as are the others.

Admiral MOORER. Let me tell you how it works.

I want to point out again, and I don't think everyone—I have already mentioned it briefly, but the National Security Council is, in effect, the President's staff. That is what it is. And he can run it any way he likes, just like any Chief Executive can run his staff just like he likes. And no two Presidents do it the same way.

For instance, I told you about Mr. Johnson. They had the Tuesday lunch. Mr. Nixon, having been Vice President under Mr. Eisenhower, set it up again essentially like Mr. Eisenhower had it. But the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at least when I was Chairman, went to every National Security Council meeting, every one of them.

And what Mr. Nixon would do would be, you start out with, say, a briefing by CIA on the current situation; then you would have a description or statement by Kissinger as to what the issue was. And there are those who support this and those who support that. But he never took a position himself, although I am sure he took a position privately, but never took a position at the National Security Council meeting.

And then the President would start right down the line—Secretary of State, ask him what he thought. And then the Secretary of Defense, ask him what he thought. Then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ask him what he thought.

If when it got to me, if I knew that a particular individual on the Joint Chiefs of Staff was—did not agree with the option they were talking about, I would say it is my duty to inform you that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force does not agree with this, or that he does agree, and I do not agree with it. In other words, I would tell him—if there was a difference among the Chiefs as to the opinion on the issue, I felt it my duty to call to the attention of the President that these individuals did not agree with this approach.

So the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did have an opportunity, as was pointed out, to discuss these points with the Secretary of Defense and the President far greater than the other members. But I think—I don't think any President has had enough discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I really don't. He sees the Chairman all the time, but he doesn't see the other members.

I think any President would be better served if he talked to them more. I think Mr. Reagan has tried to do something about that, as I understand. But in the days of Nixon and Carter, I don't think it was very often. And I think it is very important. The President has got a man chasing him around with the information relative to nu-