Mr. WHITE. Mr. Speaker, serious organizational flaws mar the performance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, our highest military body might fail to function adequately in case of war. And, as was the case during World War II, World War I, and as far back as the Spanish-American War, we would be faced with the necessity of making fundamental changes to our military organization in the midst of a crisis. The most casual observer must realize that there may not be time for such a realignment in a future conflict. Equally important in a continually threatening peacetime environment, timely, clear-cut, realistic, feasible, and prudent professional military advice is often not available to civilian leaders. Consequently, the influence of the military in civilian counsel has diminished over time and, because decisions must nevertheless be made, has often been overshadowed by civilian analysts.

Those and many other significant criticisms of the joint military structure are voiced persuasively by an impressive body of critics who recently shared their views with the Congress.

On February 3, 1982, Gen. David C. Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced in a hearing before the Armed Services Committee that he was concerned about basic shortcomings in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He further stated that he intended to submit proposals to correct those shortcomings and would work to achieve their acceptance throughout the remaining months of his tenure and thereafter. Though the joint military structure has received much criticism over the years, it was nevertheless unprecedented for an incumbent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fault the organization in such explicit terms and announce a determined reform effort. Almost as extraordinary was the subsequent action of Gen. Edward C. Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, who joined General Jones in criticizing the present structure and suggested that the Chairman had not gone far enough in his recommendations for change.

Prompted by the actions of two of the most senior Armed Forces officers in the Nation, the Investigations Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee began hearings on JCS reorganization on April 21, 1982. The subcommittee found near unanimous agreement that organizational problems hamper the performance of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. But it learned that views diverge on what, if anything, should be done to correct the existing deficiencies.

This section will outline the organizational problems of the existing military structure. It will then explain the proposed Armed Services Committee approach to correcting those deficiencies through legislation and a program of more intense legislative oversight.

Title 10 of the United States Code states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." The advice rendered by the JCS as a corporate body at present is often inadequate. The joint military system is slow to develop formal military positions. As a result, JCS advice often is not available when needed. When formal advice is finally rendered, its form and substance has been so diluted by the joint staffing process, which in effect gives each service a veto on every word, that it is of little use to civilian leaders. According to former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown:

> When it comes to the formal product, the papers that come up through the Joint Staff that are approved by the action officers, the planners, the various desks, and the chiefs themselves, and to which they put their signatures, are almost without exception either not very useful or the reverse of being helpful. That is, worse than nothing. I think that is the difference between the people and the system.

The advice rendered by the JCS is also faulted for a lack of realism and the absence of strategic content. The structure of the Joint Chiefs is such that the group often cannot deal realistically with issues which affect service interests. Those issues include matters of fundamental importance to national security: The allocation of resources to various defense missions; the unified command plan which assigns the geographical and functional responsibilities of field commanders; roles and missions of the services; and joint doctrine and training. Concerning strategic thought, witnesses suggested that the multitude of disparate responsibilities shouldered by the chiefs leaves little time or inclination for reflective strategic analysis.

Witnesses uniformly distinguished between the performance of individual service chiefs, whose personal advice was given high marks, and the performance of the JCS as a group of advisers acting collegially. Thus, the hearings clearly indicated that JCS problems are organizational in nature and by no means reflect on the competence of the members. Aong the most significant of the organizational problems which the committee proposes that Congress do something about through legislation are the following:

The contradiction between the responsibilities of an individual as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as chief of his service. As a JCS member, a Chief is called upon to transcend service interest and participate in developing advice from a joint, unified military perspective—a "national" viewpoint. Yet, as a chief of service, the same individual is looked upon as its principal advocate. General Jones emphasized that:

> If a chief departed a great deal, and consistently, from what came up through the system—from his service—he would be in danger, as has happened in the past, of losing the support of his service.

Also contradictory is the time demanded by the dual responsibilities of the chiefs. Gen. Omar Bradley once indicated that he did not have time to do both jobs well. And General Meyer emphasized this point forcefully during the hearings.

The Institutions of the Joint Staff. The quality of Joint Staff work is adversely affected by a number of restrictions. Some of these constraints are contained in present legislation; others result from the overwhelming influence exerted by service interests on the joint military organization. In combination, the restrictions have a number of adverse results: A lack of Joint Staff continuity because assignments are legally limited to 3 years; no guarantee that the most outstanding officers will be assigned to this most important and complex of U.S. military staffs; and crippling procedural constraints that give inordinate influence to service staffs, thereby preventing the Joint Staff from authoring its own work.

Though the hearings revealed a number of other significant problems, the Armed Services Committee chose to attack the most serious, improving

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