the quality of military advice, in H.R. 6954 for several reasons. The legislative measures required to remove restrictions and make the joint military organization more independent are relatively clear cut, modest, and noncontroversial. Moreover, they may possibly be sufficient in themselves with respect to necessary changes in the law because the Secretary of Defense possesses significant authority to initiate internal reorganization without resort to Congress. A larger purpose of H.R. 6954 is to encourage internal Department of Defense action. The committee intends to monitor the process through periodic oversight hearings. In the meantime, the committee would much rather err on the side of caution than to strike out into the uncharted waters of fundamental organizational change. If joint military performance does not improve sufficiently as a result of H.R. 6954 and subsequent Defense Department action, the Congress can always reexamine the organization and implement any additional changes which may be necessary.

Another reason for a modest approach is the reservations expressed by some witnesses who, despite generally acknowledging that problems exist, oppose organizational change. The bill is designed to address many of the major areas of concern voiced by advocates of reorganization while accommodating, through specific legislative provisions, the reservations of opponents. H.R. 6954 does this, however, without in any way diminishing its overall purpose of improving the quality of military advice for civilian leaders and thereby restoring the military voice to its appropriate stature in the highest councils of government.

A brief summary of the provisions in the bill illustrates the committee approach. The Chairman of the JCS would become responsible for providing military advice in his own right as well as acting as the spokesman for the Joints Chiefs of Staff and reporting to the Secretary of Defense and President those issues on which the JCS have agreed and have not agreed.

Any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who disagrees with military advice of the Chairman or the Joints Chiefs of Staff would be authorized to submit his views to the Secretary of Defense and, subsequently, to the President.

A Senior Strategy Advisory Board composed of retired former members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders of unified and specified commands would provide advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff on military strategy and tactics. They would serve without compensation except for per diem and travel expenses.

To assist the JCS Chairman in carrying out his responsibilities, a deputy chairman would be created who would act as Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman and exercise such duties as may be delegated by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. The deputy chairman would be permitted to attend JCS meetings but would participate as a full member only when acting for the Chairman in the latter's absence or disability. The Deputy Chairman would be of a different service from the Chairman.

Joint staff officers would be selected solely by the JCS Chairman from among the most outstanding service officers submitted by the respective services. The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman, would be responsible for insuring that personnel policies of the Armed Forces concerning promotion, retention, and assignment of officers give appropriate consideration to the performance of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff. The JCS Chairman would be required to submit to the President an evaluation of the performance of an officer who had served on the Joint Staff when he was recommended for promotion above major general or rear admiral.

Length of assignment to the Joint Staff, presently limited to 3 years, could be extended at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense up to 3 additional years. The limit on the number of officers serving on the Joint Staff who had been recalled to Joint Staff duty in less than 3 years would be increased from 20 to 100.

The Joint Staff would become responsible for supporting the JCS Chairman as well as the Joint Chiefs. The Chairman's responsibility for managing the Joint Staff would continue as in present law. His management, however, must take cognizance of the Joint Staff charter and would include providing support for himself as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subject to guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense, chiefs of service and unified and specified commanders would have an opportunity to provide formal comments on Joint Staff reports or recommendations prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Secretary of Defense would be responsible for insuring that the Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman in meeting the congressional purposes expressed in the National Security Act of 1947 to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

Let me now turn to one explanation of the provisions in the bill. First, provisions designed to expand and strengthen the sources of military advice.

Although the committee agrees that the dual responsibilities of service chiefs may undermine the advisory capability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate group with respect to certain issues, it is not prepared to admit that the JCS is fatally flawed. For one thing, a range of important issues do not involve service conflicts. Little criticism of JCS performance in those areas was heard during the hearings. Another consideration stems from review of the types of issues on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff allegedly stumbles. Decisions concerning such issues as resource allocation, roles and missions, and doctrine would cause intense internal conflicts within the Department of Defense whether it were organized into services, as at present, or in some other way. Those conflicts have their counterparts in most other large organizations, both public and private. Eliminating the Joint Chiefs of Staff or installing a single military individual in its stead, to whom the JCS would provide advice, would by no means eliminate the conflicting issues which must be resolved. Such measures would merely lessen the potential influence of individuals representing the collective knowledge and experience of the organizations most qualified to judge land, sea, and air warfare issues. Consequently, the committee proposes to expand and strengthen the sources of military advice, retaining the JCS as the principal military advisers.

H.R. 6954 would accomplish the committee purpose by establishing a Senior Strategy Advisory Board, strengthening the JCS Chairman's role as a military adviser, and creating a deputy chairman to assist the Chairman in his added responsibilities.

The board will fill the void in reflective thinking on military matters emphasized by several witnesses, particularly with respect to long-range strategy. It will consist of 10 retired generals or admirals who, while on active duty, served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or as a commander of a unified or specified command. The Board will provide such advice and recommendations on military strategy and tactics as it considers appropriate to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should be provided appropriate staff support by the Department of Defense, access to all necessary documents, and the requisite call on information from throughout the Department.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is uniquely qualified to assume additional responsibilities as an adviser championing the unified military viewpoint. He is the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who has no service responsibilities. Though Chairmen continue to wear the uniform of their services, experience has shown that they have traditionally assumed a joint or unified perspective in evaluation military issues, unbiased by former service ties.

H.R. 6954 makes the Chairman responsible for providing military advice in his own right and gives him access to the Joint Staff for assistance in developing his formal positions. Though

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