

in Chief, our President, served in such a reserve unit on the eve of World War II.

At the close of the Second World War, President Truman and General Marshall wanted a truly unified Armed Forces under a new Department of Defense. But resistance, particularly by the Navy, led to compromises. Many of the structural flaws that we will discuss today in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system came about as a result of those compromises made back in 1947 which had the effect of preserving autonomy for the individual services.

Mr. Chairman, I have supplied to the committee a long history of the need for reform which begins in April 1944 with the McNarney, plan goes down through 1960 to the Symington study on reorganization of the Defense Department for President-elect Kennedy, and extends all the way through the Jones reorganization proposal and last year's series of hearings. This committee is beginning another chapter in this long line of history.

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can put an end to this history and truly reform the way that business is being done in the Pentagon.

There are certain basic flaws that the present system has, and we must address ourselves to them if we want an adequate, a strong and an effective national defense.

The inherent flaws are:

The conflict of interest caused by "dual hatting" of the service chiefs.

The inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide clear and concise and timely and responsive military advice.

The inability of the "dual hatted" service chiefs to do two jobs well—first to be a member of the Joint Chiefs, and then, second, to be the service chief.

The personnel policies which lead to too much inexperience on the Joint Staff and too little reward for outstanding performance in a joint assignment.

Thus I introduced the bill H.R. 2560. I urge your favorable consideration of it. It defines the national command authorities and establishes for the first time the military chain of command in law.

It abolishes the Joint Chiefs of Staff and abolishes the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It transfers the functions and the powers and the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its Chairman to a Chief of Staff of the National Command Authorities.

It reconstitutes the present Joint Staff as the Joint Military Staff of the National Command Authorities under the Chief of Staff of the National Command Authorities.

It establishes the Chief of Staff as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

It provides for two Deputy Chief of Staffs.

It establishes promotion and appointment policies to insure that officers serving in the Joint Military Staff will be among the most outstanding of each service.

It establishes a National Military Council to provide the President and the Secretary of Defense with first, advice on management, matters pertaining to national security policy, national military strategy, and the responsibilities of the National Command