

Joint Chiefs of Staff system stem from these compromises, which had the effect of preserving autonomy for the individual services.

These examples show the historic reluctance of our military to embrace necessary change. Therefore, reforms must often be imposed from outside the military establishment, namely by us here in Congress. I followed with interest this Subcommittee's sixteen hearings on reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff last year. You are to be congratulated for taking on this difficult subject, for exploring it in depth, and for returning to the subject this year. As I reviewed the testimony from last year's hearings, I noticed that the witnesses cited a number of basic flaws in the present system. I will mention only a few:

The inherent conflict of interest caused by the "dual hatting" of the service chiefs.

The inability of the JCS to provide clear, concise, timely, and responsive military advice.

The inability of the "dual hatted" service chiefs to do two jobs well—to be a member of the Joint Chiefs and to be a service chief.

Personnel policies which have led to too much inexperience on the Joint Staff, and too little reward for outstanding performance in a joint assignment.

When I began serving on the Procurement Subcommittee this year, I was made aware of what these flaws mean in a practical sense. As it became apparent that we had to reduce the Administration's defense spending request, I began asking the various service chiefs, and other high-ranking military officials, this question: What can we do to cut defense spending without hurting our national defense? As you all know, I favor a strong national defense, and I reasoned that if cuts had to be made it would be much better for us to have the views of the military on what were really the top priorities in the defense budget. However, no one could answer my question. The present command structure, with the flaws I mentioned earlier, effectively prevents an answer. What this system gives us is most of each service's "wish list", with duplication of weapons systems, and overlapping missions and responsibilities. I am convinced that the potential for saving defense dollars by reforming the current JCS system is enormous.

There is little disagreement about the existence of defects in the current system. Where viewpoints diverge is on how far it is necessary to go in order to correct these defects. In my view, nothing less than a fundamental change in the status quo is needed. That is why I introduced H.R. 2560, the "Military Command Reorganization Act of 1983". Let me summarize some of this bill's key sections:

Section 2 defines the National Command Authorities as consisting of the President and the Secretary of Defense, and sets out the military chain of command to run from the President to the Secretary of Defense, from the Secretary of Defense to the Chief of Staff of the National Command Authorities, and from the Chief of Staff of the National Command Authorities to the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

Section 3 abolishes the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and transfers the functions, powers, and duties of these two entities to a newly created Chief of Staff of the National Command Authorities. This officer will be the highest ranking officer in the armed forces, and he will be the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. He is given the same duties that are currently assigned by law to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Provision is made for two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one of whom shall be designated to act as Chief of Staff in the absence or disability of the Chief of Staff.

Section 3 also establishes a Joint Military Staff as a successor to the current Joint Staff. Officers will be assigned to the Joint Military Staff for a period of three years and may be extended for a period of up to three additional years. There must be a three-year period between Joint Military Staff assignments, except that up to one hundred officers may be recalled to such duty in less time. The section further contains provisions designed to ensure that officer personnel policies give appropriate consideration to performance as a member of the Joint Military Staff.

Section 4 establishes a National Military Council consisting of five members of the armed forces, and, at the option of the President, one civilian. The bill specifies that the members of the Council are to be senior officers, either recalled from retirement, or on their last tour of active duty. They would be appointed for three-year staggered terms, and could be reappointed.

The National Military Council would provide the President and the Secretary of Defense with advice on matters pertaining to national security policy, national and military strategy, and the responsibilities of the national command authorities; and with independent assessments of the way in which national security policies and de-