

fense Department to adjudicate controversies among the services and to bring to the Secretary and to the President, and hence to the American people, a truly unified defense strategy and defense structure. That I strongly agree with.

I think what we are seeing today, and one of the reasons why we feel there is duplication within the budget, is that there is not a unified strategy and there is not a unified structure.

This budget that lies before you is the result of independent services operating semiautonomously. It was that that General Jones sought to correct by suggesting a restructuring of the Joint Chiefs.

I strongly support his objective. I think that a reorganization of the Chiefs would contribute to it. There are other actions that could be taken short of that. One could increase the power of the Chairman without separating the Chiefs from their services, for example.

This problem is not new. I was interested, amused, and somewhat saddened, when I read on Sunday of this week an extraordinarily interesting report of the buildup of our nuclear forces from 1945 to 1960. It quoted President Eisenhower at the end of his term as President—two terms as President—saying that with respect to this subject we are talking about now, redundancy and nuclear strategic forces, that he felt badly at having allowed the forces to expand to the extent they had and that the only action he could see that could have been taken to prevent that would have been to fully integrate the services. Short of that, he saw no way to prevent it.

What he was saying is the same thing General Jones is saying, that today we have, not as the fault of any single man and certainly not as the fault of the service Chiefs, we have services operating semi-independently of each other. It is very, very wasteful. To reduce that waste, I would support a reorganization of the Chiefs.

Mr. NICHOLS. I don't care to ask any more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your comments.

I find myself in agreement only with your last comments today, because I have a bill in to do just that very thing.

Would you expand, Mr. Secretary, on the conflict of interest that seems to be apparent in the structure as it now stands?

The service Chiefs at one moment being the head of the Navy and at another moment being a member of a Joint Committee, is there a conflict of interest that you see there, sir?

Mr. McNAMARA. I don't think there is a conflict of interest as much as there is a tendency of the service Chief, whether he is functioning as service Chief or a member of the Joint Chiefs, to be most aware of, most interested in, most concerned about the interests of his service.

Mr. SKELTON. Well, what happens—is it true that in making recommendations to the President, to the Secretary, that certainly as a committee they in essence just add up what everybody else has, rather than dig into each others territory?

Mr. McNAMARA. No. I don't think it is true that they just add it up, but they don't dig into it to the degree they would if they were separated from their services, if they had adequate staffs and adequate time to look at it from a national point of view, as opposed to a service point of view. I don't think those three carrier task forces would be in there, for example, if the Chiefs had had time to fully examine that.

Mr. SKELTON. It is a conflict of time, too, then?

Mr. McNAMARA. It is a conflict of time, exactly.

Mr. SKELTON. Do you have any judgment, Mr. Secretary, how much we could save in the defense dollar should we have a proposal enacting a law, such as my bill, that General Jones has proposed?

Mr. McNAMARA. No, I don't but I am certain it would be substantial. I will give you a figure off the top of my head. I think you can save on the order of 5 percent at a minimum, and we are talking about \$300 to \$400 billion per year, and 5 percent is a lot.

Mr. NICHOLS. We thank you, Mr. Skelton, for your interest and your dedication over many, many years in support of a strong defense. For that reason I would certainly seriously consider the proposal that you bring before the subcommittee this morning.

In looking over your statement, I notice on page 7 you indicate that the problem today is that because of the watered-down, lowest-common-denominator advice received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Secretaries of Defense have turned more and more to