

We agreed on criteria we would apply to all proposals for change. I described these in some detail last July, but I want to repeat them today:

Would the change improve our ability to wage war if we're ever forced into one? The ultimate test is the ability to transition from peace to war and to fight the war to a successful conclusion, should deterrence fail.

Would it provide the President and the Secretary of Defense better and more timely advice?

Would it better insure that the requirements of the commanders in the field, the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands, are met? These commanders in chief, the "CINCs," are the ones who will execute the war plans and fight the battles; and their needs were a key part of our review.

Would it improve the ability to allocate national security resources more wisely and efficiently—helping the President and the Secretary of Defense to meet their difficult responsibility of getting the most security from our limited budget?

The Secretary of Defense asked us to add a fifth criterion.

Would the suggested changes maintain our national legacy of civilian control of the military? We added and used that criterion.

As the starting point for our examination, we used the duties of the JCS prescribed in section 141, title 10, United States Code. Our examination of those duties outlined in the law confirmed for us that those are the correct duties and responsibilities for the JCS. Further, we concluded that the existing law gives us most of the latitude we need to improve the effectiveness of our own operation. We are working to do that now in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense and with the commanders in the field. We believe improvements are underway. There is improved personal communication among the JCS, the President and the Secretary of Defense; we are placing emphasis on the timeliness of JCS advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense; there is increased participation by the CINCS of the unified and specified commands in the program and budget decisions; and we believe we are sharpening the JCS focus on strategic matters.

We agreed last summer to call in the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands, asking each to brief us personally on his most demanding war plan and his concept of operations. We learned a great deal and have set in motion the mechanism for better planning guidance to those commanders. The CINCS have become more active participants in defense resource planning and in global operational planning; and the Secretary of defense has asked that I, as the chairman, become their spokesman of operational requirements. As a result, the advice of the CINCS has become increasingly influential in the development of joint warfare requirements and programs.

We have taken measure to assure continuity between the chairman and the JCS member acting in my absence by assigning an acting chairman on a quarterly basis.

Service schools continue to emphasize joint planning and operations; and, a training program for officers of the Joint Staff is being prepared. Our system of colleges under the National Defense University is giving new attention to joint strategies and operations at theater and global levels.

In the conduct of our review, we learned something that probably should have been obvious from the start. The challenge for any "reorganizer" is to enhance the effectiveness of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is the key man in the defense establishment; and, reform must focus on improving how he uses the JCS, his military advisors, as a part of the entire DOD organization. We determined that an important part of his effectiveness depends on how well the JCS carry out the duties prescribed for them in the law and on the effectiveness of three, interdependent relationships:

The first relationship is that among the Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense and the President, a relationship which stems from duties specified in section 141, title 10, United States Code. In the performance of these duties, we've developed a close working relationship with the Secretary and we consult regularly as a group with the President. The relationship between this particular group of Chiefs and their civilian superiors seems to me to approach what the law indicates it should be.

The second relationship is the relationship among the Chiefs as a corporate body. We must have trust and confidence in one another. Each service chief has responsibilities as the senior uniformed officer of his own service, responsibilities different from those duties he performs as a member of the JCS. These other duties uniquely distinguish each Chief as best qualified to advise on the capabilities and limitations of his service. The close relationships developed within this group of chiefs ensures that this expert advice is heard.

The third relationship, which I addressed earlier, is that among the Joint Chiefs and an important group of nine—the commanders of the unified and specified com-