

you insure that the advice you are getting is not going to be any more costly, when coupled with the realities of the forces that we have to train and equip, than we have today.

Our feeling again was that it was very difficult to find such an objective, free-thinking, and up-to-speed panel of individuals who knew the current force levels and knew their readiness posture and the like. The further you get away from that the further you get into the outmoded data base, and we have too many around today using old data, making recommendations on strategies that are outdated.

In my opinion that is where we begin to lose contact with the advisory boards—when they have statutory rather than advisory authority. So I believe it a mistake to go into that kind of assemblage of individuals, with responsibilities to the Congress and the President, who are going to get further and further away from the realities of service readiness, sustainability, and ability to fight the war as time goes on. We are going to have to keep them up to speed. I think it is layering and diluting the authorities and responsibilities the JCS now have under the law and which I think are ample to meet future requirements.

Mr. NICHOLS. Anyone else?

General MEYER. I have something to say, since you have obviously indicated I throw off no heat because my sun is setting, so I would start out by not trying to throw off heat.

It seems to me that there are two absolutes as far as any strategic advisory board is concerned. One is that whatever board it is, it must come under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There can only be one senior military adviser to the President and to others. It seems to me that however you organize it, you need one senior leader who is charged with providing military advice. That to me is one of the absolutes.

There is an area in which I would take a bit of exception to what Admiral Watkins says, and that is the transition to war and the wartime role of strategic advice. The question is whether or not, under those sets of circumstances, it will be necessary to establish a strategic advisory group which could spend the bulk of their time working on the prosecution of the war, with somebody else running the departments.

It could work either way. I would merely say that you will need in wartime the most senior, brilliant strategists you have operating full time on strategy. How you go about doing that—whether it is this body sitting there doing it or some other body—is something that has to be clearly determined.

General GABRIEL. If I could comment on the last remark made by General Meyer. Today we intend to do that in my mind by the Chiefs concentrating on the wartime mission, obviously, and the Vice Chiefs will fill in the service responsibilities. That ties in with what I wanted to say earlier about being the Acting Chairman. I had some reservation about that in the beginning and, as General Vessey said, we discussed the values of the Deputy Chairman. There are some good arguments for it. But after having been in it now these 3 months, it has been most beneficial to me and it is like wartime in the sense that General O'Malley has filled in a great deal as the Vice Chief. He is running the service and I am keeping