

erage level of experience on the Joint Staff for generals and admirals is about one year. Moreover, for those who served during the past five years, less than sixty percent had served previously in any kind of Joint assignment, even though DoD policy states that a Joint duty assignment is a prerequisite to promotion to flag rank, and Joint duty for that purpose is very broadly (actually, too broadly) defined.

This combination of lack of Washington staff experience, lack of practical knowledge of Joint activities, and lack of formal preparation through the Joint school system—coupled with the very short tours without repetition—makes it very difficult for Joint Staff officers, no matter how capable, to deal effectively with their responsibilities. Thus, the Charter and the JCS as a corporate body are similarly handicapped.

Actually, Joint assignments are seldom sought by officers. There are few rewards and there are significant hazards. A Joint position removes them from the environment for which they've been trained, in which they have established relationships and reputations, and in which they seek advancement. Joint duty places them in a wholly new environment involving unfamiliar procedures and issues for which most of them have little or no formal training. Their fitness reports, which affect their careers and prospects for advancement, are often entrusted to officers of other Services with little in common way of professional background. This makes them apprehensive.

Adding to these concerns is the perception that much of the work in Joint duty assignments is unproductive. Too much effort is wasted on tedious inter-Service negotiation of issues until they have been debased and reduced to the "lowest common level of assent", as noted by Mr. Steadman in his 1978 report.

Thus the general perception among officers is that a Joint assignment is one to be avoided. In contrast, most Service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete accomplishment and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers opt for Service assignments rather than risk Joint duty.

In their testimony during the 1982 HASC hearings on JCS reform, Admirals Harry Train and Thor Hansen provided further evidence that confirmed the findings of the Brehm Study:

Admiral TRAIN. Some services do not make an equitable distribution of top quality planners and staff officers between the service staffs and the Joint Staff. Some do. Some do not. Some services over the years have intimidated their officers serving on the Joint Staff. In retrospect I unconsciously contributed to this when I was serving as the deputy director of strategic plans and policy on the Navy Staff. I suffered from it when I served as director of the Joint Staff. So I saw both sides of the problem.

From this observation I conclude the Joint Staff should be responsible to the chairman as opposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body.

Admiral HANSEN. The individual services do not now treat joint duty assignments with equal emphasis. In my opinion, the Air Force gives the highest priority to sending quality front runners to the Joint Staff, often first as majors, and then reassigning them to subsequent tours.

The Navy gives joint duty the lowest priority of any of the services. Although snapshots can be misleading, these examples are indicative of the difference.

During my 2 years as director, not one lieutenant commander or commander on the Joint Staff was elected below the zone for promotion. Almost every Air Force