

The *Departmental Headquarters Study*, submitted in June 1978, also focused upon layering in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments and its associated redundancy and duplication. In this regard, the study stated:

. . . we believe that layers should be reduced when their number produces duplication rather than a needed diversity of views. (page 45)

In his book, *Thinking About National Security*, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown argued that within the Military Departments there is a need

To reduce the number of levels in an overly layered managerial structure . . . (page 208)

The unchecked power of the services chiefs can also weaken the expression of the Joint perspective the ability of the combatant commander to prepare his forces for combat missions and other uses. Many of those who have served as unified commanders have described the restraints that result from this fact:

Gen. Bernard Rogers, commander in chief of the European Command: "There is an imbalance between my responsibilities and accountability as a unified operational commander and my influence on resource decisions. . . . There remains in Washington a preeminence of service goals in the program and budget process."

General Nutting of the Readiness Command: "There is an imbalance between my operational responsibilities and influence over resource decisions. . . . The system as it is presently constituted depends inordinately on cooperation and goodwill in order to function—which is to say the present system contains internal contradictions."

Admiral Crowe, as commander in chief of the Pacific Command: "On occasion the results of major service decisions, not previously coordinated with me, have affected my ability to execute [my command's] strategy. . . . In the field of logistics, except for the influence I am able to exercise in the development of service program priorities. I am dependent on my component commanders not only to compete successfully for sustainment resources within their service [plans] but also to represent me in balancing and distributing stocks, ammo, petroleum, etc., in locations and ways that support my theater strategy. Therefore, until the (unified commanders) have a greater input into general logistical matters, the unified command's plans and strategy remain largely dependent upon the degree of service chief support my component commanders and I are able to obtain."

Finally, the lack of a coherent policy and strategy foundation for service programs has grown endemic. This has already been noted in relation to the weaknesses in the Joint Structure. But it is probably true also that the currently ineffective approach to civilian control allows this to happen.

Two recent National Security Advisers to the President have entered ringing indictments in this regard.

Zbigniew Brzezinski:

My own experience in the White House, working closely with President Carter, was that our military establishment has become, over time, increasingly unresponsive either to the pressing threats to our national security or to effective presidential direction.

Henry Kissinger:

By contrast, the inevitable and natural concern of the service chiefs—with their competitive and often mutually exclusive mandates—is the future of their services which depends on their share of the total budget. Their incentive is more to enhance the weapons they have under their exclusive control than to plan overall defense policy.