ant Commands; for prescribing their force structure; and for oversight of the assignment of forces by the Military Departments. To be effective, this authority requires broad latitude and flexibilty and calls for a minimum amount of statutory constraint. Restrictions in the law that prohibit the establishment of certain command arrangements should be repealed. My authority as Commander in Chief is sufficient to deal with any necessary command arrangements or adjustments in the assignment of forces that unforeseen circumstances could require.

—In moving to strengthen the role of the Combatant Commanders we must establish an appropriate balance between enhancing their influence in resource allocation and maintaining their focus on joint training and operational planning. The Combatant Commanders must have sufficient authority and influence to accomplish their mission, within the constraints necessarily established by the Secretary, without being burdened with administrative responsibilities that detract from their primary role as operational commanders.

—Finally, we must not legislate departmental procedures. The changes I have initiated concerning the defense planning and budgeting process provide for the further development of the role of the Combatant Commanders. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the Department's internal resource allocation process to be defined in law. The establishment and evolution of such procedures must remain the prerogative of the Secretary of Defense.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.—In the relationship between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Combatant Commanders, there is a special role for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman ranks above all other officers and devotes all of his time to joint issues. I deal with him or his representative on a regular basis and he serves as the primary contact for the Secretary and me on operational military matters. As a matter of practice, the Chairman also functions within the chain of command by transmitting to the Combatant Commanders those orders I give to the Secretary. Under the directive I recently signed to implement the recommendations of the Packard Commission, this practice will be broadened and strengthened.

In this regard, I have concluded that the Chairman's unique position and responsibilities are important enough to be set apart and established in law, and that he should be supported by a military staff responsive to his own needs and those of the President and the Secretary of Defense. In reaching this judgment I have carefully weighed the view that concentration of additional responsibility in the Chairman could limit the range of advice provided to me and the Secretary, or somehow undermine the concept of civilian control. While this concern is understandable, it does not apply to the structural changes I would endorse. Since the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to function together as military advisors and the Secretary's military staff, and the Chairman will continue to report directly to the President and the Secretary of Defense, none of the new responsibilities of the Chairman that I propose would diminish the authority or control of the Secretary of