

One of the tragedies of unification is that there are not, at the top, men who really know enough about each of the services to evaluate all of those services. (The New York Times, October 16, 1949, page 34)

Unfortunately, this statement is nearly as true today as it was in 1949. DoD has given insufficient attention to the development of military officers capable of effectively performing the responsibilities of joint duty assignments. In addition, the substantial disincentives to serving in such assignments have been permitted to persist.

#### *4. Imbalance between the responsibilities and the command authority of the unified combatant commanders*

The concept of unified command, as formulated in the immediate postwar period and articulated by President Eisenhower in 1958, has not been adequately implemented. At that time, President Eisenhower stated:

Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command, I emphasize that each unified commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of his command. \* \* \* Today a unified command is made up of component commands from each military department, each under a commander of that department. The commander's authority over these component commands is short of the full command required for maximum efficiency.

Despite President Eisenhower's efforts, the authority of the unified combatant commanders remains extremely limited. They have weak authority over their Service component commands, limited influence over resources, personnel, and joint training, and little ability to promote greater unification within their commands. As a result, the unified combatant commands remain loose confederations of single-Service forces which are often unable to provide effective unified action across the spectrum of military missions.

#### *5. Confused and cumbersome operational chains of command*

There is confusion over the roles of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational chain of command. As a result, the appropriate relationships between the unified and specified combatant commanders and those above them in the chain of command are uncertain. Moreover, the combatant commanders lack the authority to specify the chains of command within their commands to meet operational needs. As a result, the chains of command are often cumbersome and ill-suited to effective operational command.

#### *6. Ineffective strategic planning*

The overall performance of DoD suffers from the predominance of the programming and budgeting phases of the resource allocation process. Too much of the time and attention of senior DoD civilian and military officials is consumed by resource decisions. This has led to insufficient attention to strategic planning. Moreover, there is a weak relationship between strategic planning and fiscal