

the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

Our idea here was to make it certain that not the Chairman alone, as the Senate bill provided in substance, but all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers. By this we are trying as nearly as we can to prevent a single Chief of Staff concept from developing in the Pentagon or in the White House.

To tie this point down, the House conferees proposed that the declaration of Congressional policy in the National Security Act be amended to provide that the Congress does not intend "to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff." We cannot make it any clearer than it is as to what our intention is.

What we have provided is a man who will expedite the business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and preside at their meetings. We intend nothing more, and we do not want him to be anything more than that. I believe we have tied the point down as tightly as we can in law. Happily, the Senate agreed fully with the House conferees.

Although it is clear that the situation has changed and that an expanded role for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be both necessary and useful, it is far from self-evident that the country will benefit from such a radical restructuring as the bill provides, and as the House provides in separate legislation. Unless we consider our predecessors to have been fools, we would do well to consider carefully the reasons for their decision on this matter.

Moreover, the Report language goes even further, in its discussion of Title I, Section 151(b), than the Committee's consideration of the question warrants. Specifically, it contends that "The Committee expects the Chairman to develop and offer his own advice without any implied mandate to reconcile it with the views of the other JCS members." Lest there be misunderstanding, that issue was not specifically considered by the Committee. Certainly the Chairman would be free to develop his own views, and would have a responsibility to do so, but at the same time it is clear, from the provisions in Section 151(e), that consultation is expected and, in most circumstances, required. The thrust of the Committee's consideration was to remove an implied requirement for *unanimity* on the JCS, not to remove the Chairman from all responsibility to consult, consider, debate, and seek consensus when possible, necessary, and useful.

Similarly, it is not at all clear that, as the Report says in reference to Section 151(c), the Committee intended that there be "only two ways in which members of the JCS other than the JCS Chairman may provide advice to the President, the NSC, or the Secretary of Defense." In fact, the intention of the Committee in accepting the compromise of which Section 151(c) was a part was purely and simply to accompany the designation of the Chairman as the "Principal Military Advisor" with the designation of the other members of the JCS as "Military Advisors."