

(18) repeal the authority of the Secretary of Defense to reorganize DoD positions and activities that have been established in law;

(19) direct the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures for the effective review of the programs and budgets of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities;

(20) direct the JCS Chairman to advise the Secretary of Defense on the wartime preparedness of certain Defense Agencies;

(21) specify the responsibilities of the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Secretary of Defense;

(22) require the elimination of duplication between the headquarters staffs of each Military Department;

(23) specify that the functions of the Military Departments (to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, etc.) are undertaken to meet the operational requirements of the combatant commands;

(24) reduce personnel in DoD headquarters staffs by 8,232;

(25) reduce personnel in the non-headquarters elements of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities by 9,462; and

(26) waive the requirements for 268 Presidential or DoD reports, notifications, and studies to be provided to the Congress.

BACKGROUND

During World War II and the first 13 years of the postwar period, the current structure of the U.S. military establishment evolved through a series of organizational changes. The wartime changes, such as the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified combatant commands, were not then incorporated into the laws governing the U.S. military establishment. The experiences of World War II, however, were the major impetus behind the National Security Act of 1947 which created a unified National Military Establishment. Additional statutory changes occurred in the 1949 Amendments, which created the Department of Defense, and the 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act. In 1953, President Eisenhower made a number of additional changes in the form of Reorganization Plan No. 6.

No major statutory changes in defense organization have occurred since 1958. Despite the absence of change, a series of studies over the past three decades has continuously questioned the effectiveness of the organizational arrangements for the U.S. military establishment. Concerns about organizational shortcomings, voiced earlier, were again raised at the beginning of the 1980's.

During February 1982, General David C. Jones, USAF, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in an article, entitled "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change" (Directors & Boards, Winter 1982), that structural problems diminish the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His remarks were soon followed by similar criticism of the JCS system by General Edward C. Meyer, USA, then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. The public expression of these views by two incumbent members of the JCS renewed serious consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and eventually led to a much broader ex-