

Staff, and the combatant commanders, in developing cogent, non-parochial advice on tough issues for civilian decision makers.

Dissolving the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also severely diminish the influence on joint military matters of service chiefs who represent the collective knowledge and experience of the organizations most qualified, along with the unified and specified commands, to analyze and evaluate land, sea, and air warfare issues. The effect would be to sever the existing organizational linkage that ties service "input" (organizing, training, and equipping armed forces) to joint combatant command "output" (i.e., warfighting capability). Former Air Force Chief of Staff Lew Allen, whose testimony generally supported the reforms contained in H.R. 3622, emphasized the importance of preserving the JCS linkage between the input and output sides of the national defense structure:

I believe it is important that the Service Chiefs continue to perform the dual roles of head of a Service and a member of the JCS because they provide the essential linkage between joint strategic planning and the resultant force programming, equipping, and training performed by the Services. These two roles are not in conflict—on the contrary, these two responsibilities must be integrated to insure the Services can affectively and responsively satisfy joint requirements. It is incongruous to state that a Chief has the time to concentrate on Service—related programming and budgeting issues—but not on the joint strategic planning issues which define and shape those same Service programs. Effective joint planning cannot be done in a vacuum by a purely advisory group, free of the responsibility to implement or support those plans. Military advice is trusted most from those who are responsible and prepared to provide the capabilities to implement that advice.

The problem with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as currently structured (particularly when it attempts to address issues that involve the interests of the services, such as resource allocation) is the classic problem faced by committees composed of coequal individuals who represent strong, conflicting interests. Such a group arrives at positions either by dividing along the lines of the competing interests or by negotiating a mutually acceptable consensus in which each member supports the claims of the others. The result is that the JCS frequently acts as a negotiating forum in which each service seeks to maximize its position through bargaining.

What is wrong with such a system? Legislators understand how a committee system based on bargaining works. The question is whether that is the way military advice should be formulated. The Committee on Armed Services believes that there are two things wrong with the bargaining approach as it applies to the senior military structure of the Nation.

First, JCS bargaining produces military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense fundamentally different from what was intended by the legislators who created the JCS—and, more important, of less value, because it is bartered. The committee questions, for example, whether the Iran hostage rescue attempt would have been planned and executed as it was, with all four services in-