

volved, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not structured as a committee of five coequal members. The framers of the National Security Act sought in the JCS an organization composed of the highest military leaders that would deliberate and render advice from a national perspective detached from, but cognizant of, service interests. Instead, because the law created a committee of equals, with no mechanism for enforcing a joint military perspective, the JCS product is bartered to the "lowest common denominator" that will produce consensus.

General David Jones, the former JCS chairman, illustrated this point in his testimony:

I can recall one time that we had sent a memo to the Secretary of Defense, fully agreed to, signed off on by all five Chiefs. He brought it down to discuss it with the Chiefs. After an hour and a half of lively discussion, he said, "I don't see anybody here that endorses the views of this paper." That was true in that each chief had compromised to a point on the document so they would all agree.

The second reason the nation can ill afford a barter system in achieving military advice is that bargaining can not produce compromises acceptable to the services in a number of contentious areas. As a result, as noted earlier in this report, the JCS does not adequately address a broad range of fundamental issues that shape the core of the U.S. defense posture. These issues include advice on programs and budgets that determine the very composition and structure of U.S. armed forces, roles and missions of the services, joint military doctrine, the composition, geographical assignments, and missions of our combat commands around the world, and joint military training. Because these issues often demand decisions, and because the committee of principal military advisers can not deal effectively with them, they are dealt with elsewhere, either by the services or by civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The committee concludes that the JCS as structured can not meet the congressional purpose stated in the National Security Act of 1947: to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces.

The committee proposes in H.R. 3622 to expand and strengthen the sources that render military advice, thereby altering the dynamics of the formulation of joint military advice and the responsibility for performing other joint functions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would continue to be a key institution in the joint structure. But H.R. 3622 would strengthen the roles of the JCS chairman and the combatant commanders in developing and providing military advice and would increase the status of military advice in the National Security Council. To effect these results, the bill would provide for reorienting the Joint Staff toward an increased emphasis on joint military concerns and would create a deputy chairman who would become the director of the Joint Staff.