

Most important, though, is the fact elevating the Chairman to a permanent seat in the NSC would make the JCS Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, his civilian boss, equals under those circumstances. This would be especially dangerous to civilian authority when combined with separate provisions in the bill which designates the Chairman as the "principal military advisor" to the President.

The JCS Chairman would be required by law to "participate fully in [NSC] deliberation." While in the deliberations, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS may or may not agree on specific issues, broad political or military goals, or any number of other items of a military or non-military nature that may come before the Council. The fact that the JCS Chairman would not be a voting member makes little difference in the case of the NSC when, by all accounts, the deliberations are what are important and votes are seldom taken. In any event, the civilian authority over the military is at least vague, if not seriously undermined.

This would be particularly true if a trend developed in which the JCS Chairman regularly prevailed over his superior in the decisions before the Council. As Navy Secretary John F. Lehman has argued, "What Secretary of Defense, no matter how highly regarded, no matter how well qualified, can stand against a uniformed military with one point of view?" Eventually, if a Secretary of Defense lost enough of these skirmishes, a situation of "no confidence" may arise, where he would feel compelled to step down from his post because of his lessened stature in direct correlation to the increased stature of a subordinate.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Assistance to the President for National Security Affairs, testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on the subject of the designation of the JCS Chairman as a statutory member of the NSC. In his testimony, Dr. Brzeninski said:

The issue, therefore, should be judged not in terms of the JCS contribution to the NSC deliberations as such, but rather in terms of the relationship between the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.

While I strongly favor the reforms proposed by Gen. David Jones for the enhancement of the role and status of the Chairman of the JCS, I would be concerned over changes which dilute the authority of the Secretary of Defense as the President's principal officer on defense matters.

There is an important political dimension to this change in statute. The members of the NSC are making decisions which affect our national security, but not all matters which affect our national security have direct military applications. Many, I would submit, are more political in nature. In either case, to require by law that the JCS Chairman participate fully in all deliberations, means that he becomes a direct participant in these political and military decisions. Moreover, he becomes regarded as such by not only the members of the NSC, but also by the military establishment, the Cabinet, the Congress, and by international observers of the Ameri-