

can policy process. As a professional military person, he becomes a key political player as well. This has serious and damaging implications for our tradition of civilian control over the military.

This change in law would have serious international consequences as well. As the United States allocates more and more of its scarce resources to our military and as we project the symbols of that increased military might to virtually all corners of the world, we would be sending the world community another signal: that we are politicizing the uniformed military and are giving it a direct voice, in addition to, and perhaps contrary to the voice of the Secretary of Defense, in the top level of deliberations of the White House. I would disagree with the notion that would be a desired objective. Not only is this a politicization of the military but, as the military becomes a more dominant force in the deliberations, one could argue that it becomes a militarization of politics as well.

The point has been made that a politicized Chairman of the JCS will also cause the President to consider this factor when appointing the Chairman, and that it is reasonable to assume that the President will want a Chairman who will be able to represent his particular political point of view in the NSC. This could be at the expense of, or contrary to, the military advice he might otherwise be giving.

Since current law allows the members of the NSC to have the full benefit of the JCS Chairman's advice, the only reason to elevate him to a position of virtual equality with the Secretary of Defense is to enhance his political stature. His would clearly be at the expense of the Secretary of Defense, and most importantly at the expense of the doctrine of civilian control of the military.

It is mainly for these reasons that I dissent from the favorable reporting of this bill. I have some other objections which I will briefly outline as follows:

PAROCHIALISM

Much of the rationale for this bill rests in the idea that the current structure of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff virtually ensures that each service will be looking out for its own welfare over that of the other services. There is much history to suggest that this is in fact the case.

But, I find fault with the argument that this bill is meant to reduce the incidence of redundant weapons systems which is supposed, by that logic, to have come from this interservice rivalry. While I do not disagree that this is certainly a contributing factor, I submit that the ultimate responsibility for the massive duplications in weapons systems rests with the authorizing and appropriating committees of Congress. These committees hold the hearings, ostensibly weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each system, and as is our responsibility as elected officials, make the tough decisions on how to spend the taxpayers money. Without our approval of those requests, the systems would never be funded, JCS rivalry notwithstanding.