

Moreover, the JCS chairman was made responsible for selecting Joint Staff officers and determining when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to be decided. The Secretary of Defense was made responsible for ensuring that officer personnel policies of the military services concerning promotion, retention, and assignment give appropriate consideration to the performance of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff.

In 1985, four bills on JCS reorganization were introduced. H.R. 2265 contained the provisions of the JCS bill considered by the 98th Congress but which were not enacted. H.R. 2165 and H.R. 2710 provided for establishing the JCS chairman as the principal military advisor but differed in other particulars. H.R. 2314 would have abolished the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff in favor of a centralized staff headed by a chief of staff to the President and Secretary of Defense.

After the third series of hearings in as many Congresses, the Committee reports H.R. 3622, a bill that would establish the JCS chairman as the principal military advisor and require most of the changes, albeit some in modified form, contained in the provisions of the JCS bills considered by the 97th and 98th Congresses.

#### NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS

The unsettling message revealed by testimony spanning three Congresses is that organizational flaws mar the performance of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. It leads to the concern that our highest military body might fail to function adequately in case of war. This concern is not without historical precedent. During World War II, World War I, and as far back as the Spanish-American War, the United States was faced with the necessity of making fundamental changes to the military organization in the midst of a crisis. Unfortunately, no time may be available for such a realignment in a future conflict.

Equally important, is a continually threatening peacetime environment, timely, clearcut, realistic, feasible, and prudent professional military advice is often not available to civilian leaders. Consequently, the influence of the military in civilian deliberations has diminished over time and, because decisions must nevertheless be made, has often been overshadowed by civilian analysts.

Title 10, United States Code, states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." However, particularly with regard to issues that involves service interests, the advice rendered by the JCS as a corporate body at present is often inadequate. The joint military system is slow to develop formal military positions. As a result, JCS advice often is not available when needed. When formal advice is finally rendered, its form and substance has been so diluted by the joint staffing process, which in effect gives each service a veto on every word, that it is of little use to civilian leaders.

The credibility of these criticisms of JCS advice has been confirmed by many of the very officials the JCS is charged by law