Joint Staff; and the unified and specified commands—the former with subordinate service component commands.

The National Security Act, as amended, assigns the two principal functions of the department, *maintaining* and *employing* forces, to the organizational elements as follows: the Secretary of Defense is the head of the department, the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the department, and has authority, direction and control over the department. The military departments, consisting of the four services, are responsible, subject to the overarching authority of the Secretary of Defense, for *maintaining* forces—organizing, training, and equipping forces for combat and such associated responsibilities as research and development, logistics support, administration, training, maintenance, and construction. The *employing* functions are assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the unified and specified commands. These functions include providing military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense, strategic direction of the Armed Forces, joint logistics planning, establishment of unified commands, the actual accomplishment of military missions assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense, and a number of other related matters.

If this is an accurate portrayal of the organization of the Department of Defense as established in law, it bears little resemblance to the actual organization and operation of the department. *The fundamental problem of defense organization is the dichotomy between the de jure and de facto organization of the department.* The law provides for the separately-organized military departments to serve as the sources of forces that shall be integrated into "an efficient team of land, naval and air forces" for "operation under unified command." Study after study over a period of decades, as well as the comprehensive committee hearings since 1982, suggest that the joint or unified side of the Department of Defense—the unified and specified commands, the JCS, and the Joint Staff—is weak, stunted in its organizational development. The same sources suggest that the strength of the services is such that their influence far transcends the maintaining functions—organizing, training, and equipping forces—and that, in fact, the services dominate almost all aspects of the employment side of the Department of Defense structure.

The four services are the bedrock foundation of the U.S. military defense structure. They transform civilian recruits into strong, highly trained, motivated, fighting forces. They constantly explore emerging technologies to discover ways to improve the munitions and equipment they provide to their forces. In myriad ways, the services support the most complex, technically-advanced military organization the world has known.

But, valuable as they are, the services are not the organizations that should dominate the U.S. military organization for *employing* military forces. The services are constantly seeking to safeguard their own independence, to increase their share of the defense budget, to develop their own force structure, and to justify their existence to the Congress and the American people. Consequently, the services are hardly the organizations to trust with joint, cooperative, integrated military matters.