

Yet, as President Eisenhower told the Congress in 1958, joint operations are the essence of modern warfare:

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.

Congress did not heed Eisenhower's words in 1958. It failed to legislate sufficiently strong safeguards that would ensure that the concept of defense organization embodied in the law would be realized in fact.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The committee reported on the implications of this failure with respect to the flawed organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the resulting problems in two previous reports accompanying JCS legislation (H. Rept. 98-382, September 27, 1983 and H. Rept. 99-375, November 14, 1985).

The statement of former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, quoted in the 1985 report, exemplifies the problems of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Testifying as a spokesman for the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies Defense Organization Project, Laird summed up many of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shortcomings as follows:

Professional military advice that rises above individual service interests to provide a broader cross-service perspective is an essential ingredient for the effective direction and management of the defense establishment.* * * Today that advice comes primarily from the services,* * * What is lacking is an independent, cross-service perspective. As now organized, the JCS are too frequently unable to provide effective, cross-service advice on issues that affect important service interests or prerogatives. These issues include the most important on the JCS agenda; the formulation of national military strategy, the distribution of service roles and missions, and particularly the allocation of scarce defense resources among competing needs.* * *

The absence of a strong independent joint military voice also undercuts the strategic planning process that links ends (national objectives established by political authorities) and means (the military forces weapons, and capabilities developed by the service departments). The chairman is the only member of the JCS who is unconstrained by current service responsibilities. But he lacks both the staff and the statutory mandate to make consistently meaningful strategic planning recommendations on the broad range of subjects required. The service chiefs, on the other hand, control large staff, but the inherent conflict between