

air warfare is gone forever”—and, in the words of the National Security Act, by an integrated “team of land, sea, and air forces.”

Evidence of the absence of the joint perspective and its implications is overwhelming. Excerpts from testimony and studies provide a compelling argument for legislation.

From the 1985 Committee on Armed Services Joint Chiefs of Staff report (H. Rept. 99-375):

The quality of Joint Staff work is adversely affected by the overwhelming influence exerted by Service interests on the joint military organization. The Joint Staff is managed “on behalf of the Joint Chief of Staff.” The Service chiefs, who comprise four of the five Joint Chiefs of Staff members, have fashioned crippling procedural constraints that give inordinate influence to Service staffs, thereby preventing the Joint Staff from authoring its own work.

From the 1984 Heritage Foundation Defense Assessment Project (in *Mandate for Leadership II*):

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Joint Staff are tasked by law and by Department of Defense directive to develop strategies and contingency plans that require unified strategic direction. Yet, the JCS and the Joint Staff have not been an effective force in strategy planning. The reason is that the individual Services dominate the joint process. Today the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps vie with each other for the resources necessary to carry out their own Service-centered strategies. Each is convinced that its forces and capabilities are the most important in attaining the nation’s objectives. Beyond the goal of deterring nuclear war, the Navy has pressed for a Maritime strategy, while the Army has put forward a Continentalist approach in which its forces would play a more central role. Both compete with the Air Force’s strategic air power interests. The prize is the resources that would allow them to shape forces in molds of their individual making.

This situation is unsatisfactory. American military strategies must be based on an evaluation of the nation’s interests and objectives—and the threats to those interests and objectives. Military strategy formulation should be handled by the Joint Staff, in coordination with the commanders of the combatant commands (CINCs) and Services.

From the 1985 Investigations Subcommittee testimony of Dr. Theodore J. Crackel, who headed the Heritage Foundation Defense Project:

There is, of course, nothing new about the problems caused by the juxtaposition of a weak joint staff system and the strong Service Departments. It is a problem inherent in the compromises that created the JCS. For years studies have been calling for a strengthened joint system. The fact is, what we have is a defense structure that actually encourages the promotion of the interests of each individual service over the national interest. This system