

makes it difficult for joint staff officers to produce persuasively argued joint papers that transcend Service positions. Officers serving on the joint staff have to look to their services for future promotion and assignments. They soon learn that their services view them as representatives of the service interests, and are made to feel—and occasionally see evidence—that repeated bucking of the system will have dire career consequences. The services dominate the joint staff—top and bottom.

From the 1982 Investigations Subcommittee testimony of General David C. Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

In sum, the current Joint Staff process encourages compromise, relies too heavily on Service participation, depends on staff officers who are well-versed in Service interests but are ill prepared to address issues from a joint perspective.

From the 1978 *Report on the National Military Command Structure to the Secretary of Defense* (the Steadman report):

It is difficult for the Joint Staff to perform creditably under these procedures. The problem has been compounded by the historic unwillingness of the Services to heed the pleas of various Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the JCS to assign their most highly qualified officers to the Joint Staff. The Services have not perceived such duty as being of the highest priority and have made their personnel assignments accordingly. Many of the best officers have noted this fact and thus avoid a Joint Staff assignment if at all possible. In consequence, while the Joint Staff officers are generally capable, the very top officers of the Services more frequently are on the Service staffs.

From the 1982 Investigations Subcommittee testimony of the authors of *The Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, a report prepared at the request of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

1. *Officer Preparation and Assignment.* There are about 4,600 officer positions in U.S. Joint headquarters. While that is only three percent of all the officers in the four Services, it accounts for thirteen percent of the generals and admirals, six percent of the colonels and Navy captains, and six percent of the lieutenant colonels and commanders. The officers in these positions have major and complex responsibilities, frequently quite different from the tasks they have been trained for within their parent Services. Officers on the Joint Staff analyze major national issues such as arms limitation proposals, national security objectives, Joint military operation plans, and other topics that require a depth of knowledge of the several Services, of defense strategy, of the overall defense program, and of how business gets transacted in the Pentagon. They must develop complex planning and information systems, such