ards. A Joint position removes them from the environment for which they've been trained, in which they have established relationships and reputations, and in which they seek advancement. Joint duty places them in a wholly new environment involving unfamiliar procedures and issues for which most of them have little or no formal training. Their fitness reports, which affect their careers and prospects for advancement, are often entrusted to officers of other Services with little in common by way of professional background. This makes them apprehensive.

Adding to these concerns is the perception that much of the work in Joint duty assignments is unproductive. Too much effort is wasted on tedious inter-Service negotiation of issues until they have been debased and reduced to the "lowest common level of assent", as noted by Mr. Steadman in his 1978 report.

Thus the general perception among officers is that a Joint assignment is one to be avoided. In contrast most Service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete accomplishment and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers opt for Service assignments rather than risk Joint duty.

From the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel *report on the Department of Defense to the President and Secretary of Defense:*

> Lost in the process is the advantage of a joint staff, which, ideally, should be able to provide a more national viewpoint than staffs which are Service-oriented. This is because the procedure injects the joint participant into the process as little more than a coordinator of the views of the several services.

From the 1986 Investigations Subcommittee testimony of Admiral Harry D. Train, USN (Rept.), former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command:

> There should be some form of protection against intimidation * * *. I don't know exactly what form that protection can take, but I can tell you that intimidation does occur. Not retribution, intimidation—and there is an important difference between the words.
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> There is also the phenomenon of the services being reluctant on occasion to send their best officers to the Joint Staff for fear that those best officers will do the joint job too well, to the detriment of the Service's perceived interests. In other words, there is the fear of success on the part of good officers should they be assigned to the Joint Staff. And, in addition, the services correctly feel that they need their good officers on their own staffs to fulfill their service interests.
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> When I testified * * * in 1982, I made the point that prior to the time I served as director of the Joint Staff, I served a tour as the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans