

cising "command less opcom" has a free hand in that particular matter.

The situation that the unified commanders find themselves in with relation to their subordinate component commanders is analogous to the relationship established by the tenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people", In this case, the "powers" are reserved to a military subordinate.

The demise of the principle of unity of command

As Senator Goldwater has observed, "unity of command is one of the fundamental principles of any military operation" and "every West Point plebe knows that." The Senator went on to note that "it means there's only one commander" and to quote Napoleon who said that "nothing is so important in war as undivided command." How, then, did command of the American military come to be diffused, divided, segmented, elongated, and otherwise confused, as is indicated by the quotations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2? No definitive answer to that question can be found, but the experiences of American forces in World War I, and of General Eisenhower in World War II, suggest that the principle of unity of command should be reestablished in the U.S. military structure.

In recent times, the American military was forced to wrestle with the idea of dividing military command into functional areas during World War I when U.S. commanders resisted French efforts to segment U.S. forces into units under French command in order to move them into the trenches more quickly. If this had happened, the United States would have been responsible for support and administration of its forces while the French would have employed the forces. Thus, segmented command would have resulted. General Pershing resisted the French and he maintained the integrity of the U.S. Expeditionary Forces. When they were ready, U.S. forces, under U.S. leadership, entered the conflict as a national force.

During World War II, General Eisenhower spent much, if not most, of his time while setting up Operation Overload (the invasion of Europe) in fleshing out his command authority with America's major ally, the British, and, to a lesser degree, with the Free French. The rule among sovereign allies (still embodied in the NATO Alliance today) is that each nation is responsible for support and administration of its forces. Thus Eisenhower never exercised full command over allied forces. But Eisenhower even had to fight for clear-cut "operational" command authority over British forces. He never quite succeeded—when at times, it seemed he had succeeded, arrangements soon began to unravel.

By including "operational command" in law in 1958, the Congress established inter-service relationships analogous to those obtaining among sovereign allied nations—with the attendant built-in obstacles to genuine unified direction of the Armed Forces. Whereas the problems of command relationships are understandable between sovereign nations, within a nation it is entirely a matter of policy if military command relationships are established in this way.