

General Eisenhower, on the other hand, had no such problems with U.S. forces. He exercised full command, including authority over logistics and administration, of U.S. air and land forces. Admittedly, because the air and land forces were in the same service during World War II, any question of segmented command authority was easier to resolve. Nevertheless, considering the significance of Eisenhower's control over logistics when it was necessary to reallocate resources to sustain Patton's rapid advance, the importance of full command for a theater commander became obvious.

The question of divided command authority was a sore point between the Army and Navy in the Pacific theater. Despite the need to cooperate and act in unison, each service opposed placing its forces under the command of an officer from the other service.

The idea that command can be divided, shared, or otherwise segmented was readily adopted by military services threatened with unified command after World War II.

Until that time, the War and Navy Departments were completely separate entities. Commanders commanded. No issue arose of dividing or segmenting command. An organizational arrangement whereby U.S. military forces were to fight under unified command, integrated into "an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces . . ." changed the perspective of the heretofore autonomous services concerning unified command.

In his 1958 DOD reorganization message to Congress, President Eisenhower clearly stated his intent to straighten out the question of unified command once and for all. The Congress failed to give him what he requested. Consequently, his words ring as true today as they did 30 years ago:

We must organize our fighting forces into operational commands that are truly unified,

This lesson, taught by World War II, I learned from firsthand experience. With rare exceptions, as I stated before, there can no longer be separate grounds, sea, or air battles.

Our unified commands . . . are the cutting edge of our military machine—the units which would do the fighting. Our entire defense organization exists to make them effective.

I intend that, subject only to exceptions personally approved by the Commander in Chief, *all* of our operational forces be organized into truly unified commands.

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Commands of this kind we do not have today.

Today a unified command is made up of component commands from each military department, each under a commander of that department. The commander's authority over these component commands is *short of the full command required* for maximum efficiency. In fact, it is prescribed that some of his command powers shall take effect only in time of emergency.

I recommend, therefore, that present law, including certain restrictions relating to combatant functions, be so amended as to remove any possible obstacles to the full