

would be the most responsible. The officers who are responsible for carrying out the most significant decisions concerning the use of military forces are the unified and specified commanders who are responsible for employing U.S. forces. The service chiefs, who comprise the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by law supervise the services responsible for training and equipping forces to be employed by the unified commanders.

General P. X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, clarified the advice-responsibility linkage in 1983 in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee after the bombing of the Marine Barracks at the Beirut airport. He correctly pointed out that as Marine Commandant he was not in the chain of command to the forces in Lebanon. Both the Long Commission report and the House Armed Services Committee report on the Beirut tragedy confirmed General Kelley: "The reports held that the unified commander and his subordinates in the chain of command were responsible—not the service chiefs or the JCS—for any oversights that contributed to the tragedy."

In this light, the committee recommends the establishment of a Joint Commanders Council to provide a forum or joint advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With his added responsibilities, the chairman's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense must necessarily balance the needs of each unified or specified commander against the others because resources will always be limited. The committee believes that a constructive dialogue would result if the chairman and the combatant commanders wrestled with joint problems together. Each combatant commander would necessarily become more cognizant of the world-wide context of which he plays a part. The committee also believes that the Joint Commanders Council will assist the chairman in meeting new responsibilities, recommended by the Packard Commission, to develop alternative national strategies and corresponding budget proposals. Both the Joint Commanders Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would assist the chairman in examining the implications of various military strategies. The committee also believes that a Joint Commanders Council could assist in providing perspective on the possible employment of military forces during crisis situations.

The Joint Commanders Council, then, could assist the chairman and his superiors and at the same time increase the understanding of the unified and specified commanders. The committee does not intend, however, that the Joint Commanders Council, with a membership that spans the world, meet in the same physical location often, if at all. Rather the Council would "meet" through teleconferencing, and at the chairman's call. Members could use their own staffs; the chairman would use the Joint staff. Thus, no additional staff would be necessary.

#### REPEAL OF INDEPENDENT OPERATING AUTHORITY FOR THE NAVY

Section 5012 of Title 10 addresses the composition and functions of the Navy. Subsection 5012(a) contains the following sentence.